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MCBURNEY V. YOUNG: TESTING
THE LIMITS OF CITIZENS-ONLY
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAWS
PATRICK JAMIESON
I. INTRODUCTION
1

In McBurney v. Young, the Supreme Court of the United States
will address important questions surrounding restrictions on open
government access laws, which allow citizens to view and copy records
held by their state government. At issue is Virginia’s Freedom of
Information Act (VFOIA), which limits records requests to Virginia
2
citizens and certain qualified journalists. Petitioners Mark McBurney
and Roger Hurlbert joined together, alleging that VFOIA
impermissibly discriminates against their rights under the Privileges
3
and Immunities Clause. Additionally, Hurlbert, who makes his living
retrieving property records for clients, argues that VFOIA stands in
4
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
McBurney presents an opportunity for the Court to define the
ambiguous boundaries of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and
the dormant Commerce Clause. Specifically, under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, the Court could address whether, as the Third
Circuit decided, access to state records directly implicates one’s ability
5
to engage in the national political process. Additionally, this case asks
whether, under the dormant Commerce Clause, the restricted
distribution of public records impermissibly discriminates against
interstate commerce and whether such records can be construed as


J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2014. I thank Professor Joseph Blocher,
Andrew Hand, Christine Kearsley, Donata Marcantonio, Katie McEvilly, Tara McGrath, Ali
Mirsaidi, Zi-Xiang Shen, and Sandra Yoo, all of whom provided excellent advice and edits.
1. McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. argued Feb. 20, 2013).
2. VA.CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(A) (West 2013).
3. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 458 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 5,
2012).
4. Id.
5. See Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For a discussion on Lee, see infra Part III, section C.
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6

articles of commerce. Every state, particularly those with noncitizen
access restrictions, will be watching intently to see whether the Court
will mandate open access to state records, regardless of state
citizenship.
II. FACTS
A. A History of Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act
In 1968, Virginia’s General Assembly passed the Virginia Freedom
7
of Information Act. The stated purpose of the statute is to provide
the “people of the Commonwealth ready access to public records in
the custody of a public body or its officers and employees, and free
entry to meetings of public bodies wherein the business of the people
8
is being conducted.” The statute provides, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all public records
shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizens of the
Commonwealth . . . . Access to such records shall not be denied to
citizens of the Commonwealth, representatives of newspapers and
magazines with circulation in the Commonwealth, and
representatives of radio and television stations broadcasting in or
9
into the Commonwealth.

Virginia law provides that the State may recoup its cost of
providing such records by “mak[ing] reasonable charges not to exceed
its actual cost incurred in accessing, duplicating, supplying, or
10
searching for the requested records.” Although the State recoups
some of the expenses associated with providing records, it claims that
“a significant portion of the costs associated with the provision of
public records is borne by the taxpayers of the Commonwealth, not
11
by the requesters of public records.”
B. Background of McBurney’s Case
Mark McBurney, one of two petitioners in this case, is a resident
12
of Rhode Island. Prior to moving to Rhode Island, McBurney

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
2012).

Brief for Petitioners at 16–17, McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. Dec. 26, 2012).
1968 Va. Acts 691.
VA.CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700(B), para. 1 (West 2013).
Id. § 2.2-3704(A) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2.2-3704(F).
Brief for Respondents at 2, McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2013).
McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 459 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 5,
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resided in Virginia and maintains ties to Virginia through his divorce
13
order, child custody order, and child support order. When
McBurney’s former wife failed to pay her child support obligations,
he, while residing in Rhode Island, requested assistance from the
Virginia Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE) to petition
14
for the unpaid child support obligations. Although the DCSE filed
the request, McBurney’s child support payments were delayed by
15
nine months. McBurney filed a VFOIA request with the DCSE “to
get to the bottom of the agency’s repeated mishandling of its
responsibility to enforce child support obligations owed by his former
16
wife, a Virginian, while McBurney was living [out of state].”
McBurney argues that DCSE at least twice, and perhaps as many as
17
four times, filed his petitions in courts that lacked jurisdiction. The
State denied McBurney’s first VFOIA request, claiming that the
requested information was confidential and protected under Virginia
18
law, and emphasizing that McBurney was not a Virginia citizen.
McBurney made a second “substantively identical request” that the
DCSE denied exclusively on the grounds that McBurney was not a
19
Virginia citizen.
McBurney later received some requested
information under Virginia’s Government Data Collection and
Dissemination Practices Act, but did not receive the general
20
information he sought about how the DCSE handles claims like his.
C. Background of Hurlbert’s Case
Roger Hurlbert is a California resident whose business involves
obtaining property records from state and local governments for
21
various clients throughout the United States, including Virginia.
Hurlbert obtains these documents “by making requests under state

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 13.
17. Id.
18. McBurney, 667 F.3d at 459; see VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-102 (“[N]o record, information
or statistical registries concerning applicants for and recipients of . . . child support shall be
made available except for purposes directly connected with the administration of such
programs. Such purposes include establishing eligibility, determining the amount of . . . child
support, and providing social services . . . .”); see also id. § 63.2-103 (“Information pertaining to
actions taken on behalf of recipients of child support services may be disclosed to the recipient
and other parties pursuant to Board regulations.”).
19. McBurney, 667 F.3d at 459.
20. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 14.
21. Id. at 12.
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open-records statutes and negotiating with officials for their
22
release.” In 2008, Hurlbert filed a VFOIA request in order to obtain
23
property records for certain estate parcels in Virginia. The State
24
denied Hurlbert’s request because he is not a citizen of Virginia.
D. Procedural History
Joining together as plaintiffs, McBurney and Hurlbert filed a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
25
various state and local officials in Virginia. The district court held
that McBurney and Hurlbert failed to show that the citizens-only
provision of VFOIA burdened a fundamental right under the
26
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Further, the district court held
that VFOIA did not violate Hurlbert’s rights under the dormant
27
Commerce Clause. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
28
holdings on both grounds.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Arduous Task of Defining Privileges and Immunities of State
Citizenship
The Supreme Court has observed that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause “is not one the contours of which have been
precisely shaped by the process and wear of constant litigation and
29
judicial interpretation over the years since 1789.” The Clause simply
states: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. McBurney, 667 F.3d at 460.
25. McBurney v. Mims, No. 03:09-CV-44, 2009 WL 1209037, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 1, 2009),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393 (4th Cir. 2010). A third
plaintiff (a journalist) was present in the district court and on appeal at the Fourth Circuit, but
she was not, however, listed as a plaintiff during the briefing to the United States Supreme
Court. The district court initially dismissed all parties from the suit on jurisdictional grounds—
an issue not relevant to the present appeal. Id. at *7. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and
reversed in part that dismissal, holding that the parties had standing to sue. McBurney, 616 F.3d
at 403–04 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court then addressed the case once again before it was
appealed to the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court. McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 780 F. Supp. 2d
439, 446 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff’d sub nom. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012).
26. McBurney, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 446.
27. Id. at 452.
28. McBurney, 667 F.3d at 458.
29. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 379 (1978).
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30

and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” The traditional
31
meaning of the Clause comes from Corfield v. Coryell, which states
that privileges and immunities “are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
32
states which compose this Union.” Essentially, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause “prevents a State from discriminating against
33
citizens of other States in favor of its own.”
The Court articulated a two-step inquiry in Supreme Court of
34
Virginia v. Friedman (the Friedman test) to decide whether a state’s
“citizenship or residency classification offends privileges and
35
immunities protections.” First, “the activity in question must be
sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation as to fall within the
36
purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.” The purview of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause is limited to significant
discrimination involving “important economic liberties” and
37
constitutional rights. Second, the Court will invalidate a law that
deprives nonresidents of a protected privilege “only if [it] conclude[s]
that the restriction is not closely related to the advancement of a
38
substantial state interest.”
The Court has interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause
to prevent a state from imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of
other states in: (1) pursuing a common calling within the state; (2)
owning or disposing of privately held property within the state; (3)
39
accessing the courts of the state; and (4) obtaining medical services.
As a result, the Court has, inter alia, declared unconstitutional state
40
laws requiring nonresidents to pay more for trading licenses,
requiring nonresident commercial fishermen to pay significantly more
30. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
31. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (opinion of Washington, J.).
32. Id. at 551.
33. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).
34. 487 U.S. 59 (1988).
35. Id. at 64.
36. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481 (4th ed. 2011). Indeed, the Court
has never applied the Privileges and Immunities Clause in cases outside of these two categories.
Id.
38. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65 (citing Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274, 284 (1985)).
39. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 462–63 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 2,
2012).
40. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 419 (1870).
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41

for commercial fishing licenses, limiting admission to the bar to
42
residents, and giving preference to residents over nonresidents with
43
respect to employment in oil and gas leases.
Despite such prohibitions, states still may use state citizenship or
residency to distinguish among persons, such as for purposes of
44
suffrage or qualification for an elective office in the state.
Additionally, the Court has been mindful to distinguish recreational
activities from activities that are a “means of a livelihood,” providing
protection only to the latter category under the common calling
45
justification. Indeed, in Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of
46
Montana, the Court refused to strike down a Montana law that
charged non-residents more than residents for an elk-hunting
47
license. The Court decided that an “interest in sharing this limited
resource on more equal terms with Montana residents simply does
48
not fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”
It reasoned that “[e]quality in access to Montana elk is not basic to
49
the maintenance or well-being of the Union.”
B. Awakening the Dormant Commerce Clause
The dormant Commerce Clause—a judicially created doctrine
50
derived from Congress’s Article I, Section 8 commerce power —
provides that state and local laws cannot place an undue burden on
51
interstate commerce. The threshold question under the dormant
Commerce Clause is whether a state or local law affects interstate
commerce, such as by regulating an article of commerce that travels
52
interstate.
41. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 420 (1952).
42. Piper, 470 U.S. at 274 (1985)
43. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 534 (1978).
44. See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (“Some
distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation
composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they
hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of those States.”).
45. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 279 (describing elk hunting as “recreation” and not as a “means
of a livelihood”).
46. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
47. Id. at 391.
48. Id. at 388.
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
51. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 37, at 430.
52. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“[I]t is clear that the
appellants’ order does affect and burden interstate commerce, and the question then becomes
whether it does so unconstitutionally.”).
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If the law affects interstate commerce, then the inquiry transitions
53
into a two-tiered analysis. The first tier asks whether the state or
54
local law, read on its face, discriminates against out-of-staters. By
“discrimination,” the Court “simply means differential treatment of
in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former
55
and burdens the latter.” If a law discriminates on its face, it is
56
“virtually per se invalid.” For a facially discriminatory law to be
constitutional, the state must show “that it advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
57
nondiscriminatory alternatives.” The review the Court undertakes is
58
akin to a very strict version of strict scrutiny.
If a law is not facially discriminatory, the Court moves to a second
59
tier, which it articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (the Pike test),
to determine if the law is discriminatory to out-of-staters as applied.
The Pike test dictates that nondiscriminatory regulations are valid
“unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is clearly
60
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” The Pike test
weighs the benefits of a law against the burdens it imposes on
61
interstate commerce. Most relevant to McBurney are cases involving
laws limiting out-of-staters’ access to in-state resources and laws
requiring use of local businesses. In City of Philadelphia v. New
62
Jersey, the Court struck down a New Jersey law that restricted
63
landfill use to in-state waste under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Court held that New Jersey could have reduced landfill use in a
less restrictive manner by “slowing the flow of all waste . . . even

53. Id.
54. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida–Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338 (2007).
55. Id.
56. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99
(1994).
57. Id. at 101.
58. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (“At a minimum such facial
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the
absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.”).
59. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
60. Id. at 142; see also note 67, infra (discussing how some Justices think that balancing
should not be used in evaluating dormant Commerce Clause cases).
61. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”).
62. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
63. Id. at 629.
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64

though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected.” Further,
in Pike, the Court invalidated an Arizona regulation that required
65
cantaloupes grown in the state to also be packaged within the state.
The effect of the law would have been to force growers in the state to
66
build packing facilities in the state. Even though balancing has
remained the usual approach, some are critical of the test and
recommend abandoning it because “the interests on both sides are
67
incommensurate.”
C. Circuit Split(?): The Third Circuit’s Decision in Lee v. Minner
68

In Lee v. Minner, the Third Circuit considered whether Delaware
69
could restrict access to state records to its own citizens. There, an
out-of-state journalist desired access to various state records and filed
an open records request that the State subsequently denied. The
Court held that the citizens-only provision in the Delaware Freedom
of Information Act (DFOIA) was unconstitutional because “access to
public records is a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities
70
Clause.” The court reasoned that access to public records is
necessary to engage in political advocacy, “an ‘essential activity’ which
71
‘bear[s] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.’” In this
sense, the court held that DFOIA was “facially discriminatory insofar
as it limits access to information to those individuals who are citizens
72
of the [s]tate.” Additionally, the court held that because DFOIA
precluded noncitizens from obtaining any DFOIA information, its
73
burden on noncitizens was substantial. Because the Third Circuit

64. Id. at 626–27.
65. Pike, 397 U.S. at 146.
66. Id. at 140.
67. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (advocating for the elimination of the Pike test and arguing that the default rule
should be: “a state statute is invalid under the Commerce Clause if, and only if, it accords
discriminatory treatment to interstate commerce in a respect not required to achieve a lawful
state purpose”); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[S]uch an inquiry is ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken
rarely if at all.”); Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1106 (1986) (arguing that in dormant
Commerce Clause cases not involving the movement of goods, the Court has not engaged in
open-ended balancing and instead has certain limited goals beyond economic protectionism).
68. 458 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2006).
69. Id. at 195.
70. Id. at 200.
71. Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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focused its holding on the right to engage in political advocacy, it did
not decide whether DFOIA unconstitutionally burdened the
challenger’s right to engage in the common calling of journalism on
74
equal footing with journalists in Delaware.
D. State Records under the Commerce Clause
A central question of the McBurney case is whether state records
themselves are articles of commerce and whether the retrieval of such
records affects interstate commerce. As the Court has held, “[a]ll
75
items of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection.”
Relatedly, such items and activities are subject to dormant Commerce
76
Clause restrictions. The Court has not directly held that all state
public records constitute interstate commerce. However, the Court
77
has held, in Reno v. Condon, that “drivers’ personal, identifying
78
information is . . . an article of commerce.” The Court noted that the
“sale or release of [such records] into the interstate stream of business
79
is sufficient to support congressional regulation.” Likewise, the
Court has not directly held that the service of disseminating or
80
retrieving public records is commerce, yet the Court has recognized
that the Commerce Clause extends to both the sale of actual goods
81
and to services.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioners’ Arguments
The thrust of the Petitioners’ arguments is embodied in the
unifying notion of horizontal federalism: the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause work together to
74. John Paul Jones & Afsana Chowdhury, Administrative Law, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 7, 38
(2012). For a further discussion on this, see Part V, infra.
75. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (noting that even “valueless
waste” merits constitutional scrutiny).
76. See Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574
(1997) (“The definition of ‘commerce’ is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state
legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation.”).
77. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
78. Id. at 141–42.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (“[T]he
article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing and
disposing of it.”); Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 577 n.10 (1977) (“We have long
noted the applicability of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence to service industries.”).
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“avoid[] friction and help[] ‘fuse into one Nation a collection of
82
independent, sovereign States.’” Indeed, the common origin of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause in
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation demonstrates the
Framers’ intent that the two clauses “secure and perpetuate” the
“mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of different
83
states.” Because the Articles of Confederation did not provide for a
federal enforcement mechanism, “Article IV was routinely flouted by
the states, many of which passed laws giving ‘preference to their own
84
citizens.’” This history supports Petitioners’ argument that the two
provisions mutually reinforce Constitutional rights: the Privileges and
Immunities Clause acts as a “direct restraint” and the Commerce
85
Clause acts as an “implied restraint.” Together, the provisions inform
the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of state citizenship—a
concept Petitioners argue is fundamentally at odds with VFOIA’s
86
citizens-only restriction.
Petitioners advance four points in support of their Privileges and
Immunities argument. First, they contend that VFOIA violates
Hurlbert’s right to pursue a common calling by denying him the
ability to collect, synthesize, and distribute records for a profit solely
87
on the basis of his state citizenship. Second, Petitioners argue that
Hurlbert’s access to property records is a fundamental right protected
88
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Because the Privileges and
Immunities Clause protects the right to “take, hold, and dispose of
89
property” across state lines, Petitioners argue that access to property
records is a “necessary corollary” and thus a right protected by the
90
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Third, Petitioners contend that
82. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 19–20 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395 (1948)).
83. Id. at 20 (quoting ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1).
84. Id. (quoting 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 317 (Farrand, ed.,
1911)).
85. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 23 (quoting United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984)).
86. Id. at 23–24.
87. Id. at 36.
88. Id. at 39. Going back to 1789, Virginia law barred ‘“any county surveyor’ from
‘withholding’ copies of land surveys from ‘any person,’ but extended this right to ‘any person or
persons, not resident within this state,’ provided they had paid the required copying fees or given
adequate security.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 12 HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE 589–90
(1787)).
89. Id. at 41 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (opinion
of Washington, J.)).
90. Id. at 41–42 (citing Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 387
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McBurney’s requested public records implicate his right to access
91
public proceedings. Without being able to access information about
how administrative proceedings are conducted, the right to access
92
such proceedings is frustrated. Thus, by precluding informational
access, VFOIA is essentially precluding access to the public
93
proceeding itself. This violates the Constitutional principle that a
94
state cannot restrict access to the courts based on state citizenship.
Lastly, Petitioners contend that the Fourth Circuit construed the
95
scope of the Third Circuit’s decision in Lee v. Minner too narrowly.
Petitioners do not contend that there is a “constitutional right to have
access to particular government information,” but rather that Virginia
cannot discriminate on the basis of state citizenship, absent good
96
reasons, as to who can access such information.
With respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, the Petitioners
argue that VFOIA discriminates against out-of-state economic
interests both on its face and in effect. As a threshold matter,
Petitioners argue that state public records are “articles of commerce”
under the Commerce Clause as supported by the Court’s decision in
Reno v. Condon, which recognized that public records containing
drivers’ information are “articles of commerce” because they are
“released, sold, compiled into databases, and resold for various
97
commercial purposes.” Accordingly, Petitioners further argue that
the business of retrieving records for compensation is in itself
98
commerce.
Addressing the first-tier of the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, Petitioners argue that VFOIA facially discriminates against

(1978)).
91. Id. at 44 (“The Privileges and Immunities Clause should not be read to allow states to
bar citizens of other states from equal access to their administrative proceedings, which
necessarily includes basic information about how those proceedings are conducted.”).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 42. The Clause “secures citizens of one state the right to resort to the courts of
another, equally with the citizens of the latter state.” Id. (quoting Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Clarendon
Boat Oar Co., 257 U.S. 533, 535 (1922) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
95. Id. at 46.
96. Id. (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
97. Id. at 26 (quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148–49 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
98. Id.; see also C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (“[T]he
article of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the service of processing and
disposing of it.”).
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out-of-state economic interests because it expressly reserves access to
public records to Virginia citizens, which in turn prohibits out-of-state
citizens from engaging in the commercial activity of retrieving records
99
for compensation. Even if VFOIA were not facially discriminatory,
Petitioners contend, under the Pike analysis, that VFOIA’s burden on
interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the benefits
100
created.
Petitioners rely on C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
101
Clarkstown to advance the argument that Virginia “reserves the
‘initial processing step’ of record retrieval to local businesses, denying
out-of-state businesses primary access to the market for Virginia
record retrieval just like the flow control ordinance in Carbone
denied out-of-state haulers entry into the market for the initial
102
processing [of] the town’s garbage.”
Petitioners also contend that Virginia’s justification that the costs
associated with giving non-Virginians access to public records would
reduce resources available to Virginians is factually wrong because
Virginia law authorizes the State to recoup administrative costs
103
through fees. Petitioners argue there is “no basis for concluding the
burden of processing out-of-state record requests would be greater
than the burden of supervising out-of-state lawyers . . . or processing
104
out-of-state fishing licenses.” As a result, Petitioners suggest there
are less restrictive means available—and that the “purported goal of
avoiding administrative burdens has nothing to do with the
105
requesters’ citizenship.”
B. Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents frame the Privileges and Immunities question
narrowly: “whether a statutorily created right to an at or below cost
99. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 25.
100. Id. at 28. Respondents argue that Petitioners failed to adequately address a second-tier
Pike challenge in the Fourth Circuit Briefing. Brief for Respondents, supra note 11, at 38 & n.9
(“Although petitioners claim to have given fair notice of a Pike argument in their summary of
the argument in their Fourth Circuit brief . . . a fair reading of that argument discloses only a
first-tier discrimination challenge.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
Fourth Circuit held that Hurlbert waived any challenge to the district court’s holding on the
Pike analysis. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 467 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S.
Oct. 2, 2012) (“Hurlbert has waived any challenge to that component of the district court's
analysis by not raising it in his opening brief.” (citing Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A))).
101. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
102. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 29 (quoting Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392).
103. Id. at 47.
104. Id. at 50–51 (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 53.
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search of government records is a fundamental privilege for purposes
106
of the Clause.” Respondents argue VFOIA’s purpose is political, not
economic: “[I]t is . . . intended to increase transparency in the political
process . . . [and it] is logically and properly bestowed on those
directly affected by that political process—i.e., citizens—and on media
107
with a Virginia presence.” Under this umbrella, Respondents
advance five arguments addressing Petitioners’ Privileges and
Immunities claims.
First, with respect to Hurlbert’s common calling argument,
Respondents differentiate between cases that involve explicit bans or
discriminatory monetary penalties on nonresidents performing work
in a state and VFOIA’s “remote . . . incidental effect on whatever
108
business model [Hurlbert] chooses.”
Second, responding to
Hurlbert’s property argument, Virginia argues that “records required
by law to be maintained by the clerks of the courts” are exempt from
109
VFOIA. Further, documents, including title documents, judgment
liens, tax liens, and financial statements, are “open to inspection” and
110
copying “by any person.”
Third, addressing McBurney’s “public proceedings” argument,
Respondents argue that McBurney was denied only of “some
undefined portion of the pre-suit discovery which he wanted the
government to perform on his behalf”—assistance that “has never
been thought to be a fundamental right protected by the Privileges
111
and Immunities Clause.” Fourth, Respondents contend that an
equal right to access government information has never been deemed
112
fundamental under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Although
Respondents do not directly reference the Third Circuit’s decision in
Lee, they attempt to show that any right of access to public documents
was not recognized at common law anywhere in the United States at
the time of the Framing and is “not sufficiently uniform or generous
to give rise to any equal right of access which could be deemed

106. Brief for Respondents, supra note 11, at 18.
107. Id. at 19.
108. Id. at 20.
109. Id. at 21.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
111. Id. at 22–23.
112. Id. at 23. Respondents argue that the Court should look no further than the original
meaning of “Privileges and Immunities”—protecting nonresidents from “the disabilities of
alienage.” Id. at 24 (quoting Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 380–81 &
n.19 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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113

fundamental for purposes of the [Clause].” Fifth, Respondents
argue that “practices and procedures directed to the performance of
state governmental functions may distinguish between citizens and
114
noncitizens.” Respondents base their argument on the fact that
there is no fundamental right to access public information and a state
may therefore distinguish between citizens and noncitizens when
115
providing access. As a result of its unprotected status, Respondents
argue that it does not carry the burden of demonstrating a substantial
116
relationship between the ends and means of VFOIA.
Respondents contend that the dormant Commerce Clause is not
even implicated here because VFOIA is purely an exercise of a
governmental noncommercial function, whereby the State makes
records “potentially available to certain requesters, its citizens, who
117
might or might not put them into interstate commerce.”
Respondents argue that Petitioners’ reliance on Condon for the
proposition that state records are “articles of commerce” is misplaced
and that Virginia, “in discharging a governmental noncommercial
function,” has simply made records available to its citizens who may
118
choose to put them into interstate commerce. This, Respondents
119
argue, is a “governmental noncommercial function.” If Congress
desired to regulate the dissemination of state records through the
active Commerce Clause, Respondents argue that the Court would be
120
inclined to examine the effects of a citizens-only restriction.
However, because Congress does not regulate the dissemination of
state records, Respondents do not engage in the two-tier dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, believing that the threshhold requirement
121
was not satisfied.

113. Id. at 30–31.
114. Id. at 32.
115. Id. at 36.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 39 & n.11.
118. Id. at 39. On Condon, Respondents argue that “[t]he actual holding . . . was that
Congress had the power to enact the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act under the active
Commerce Clause because States were engaged in traditional interstate commerce by selling
certain records in the interstate markets.” Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 39–40.
121. Id. at 37.
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V. ANALYSIS
The Court’s holding in this case will most strongly affect
noncitizens, journalists, advocacy groups, academics, and professional
records collectors. In reviewing the federal Freedom of Information
122
Act, the Court has noted that the purpose of open records acts is “to
123
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” In addition to the
federal open records law, all fifty states have codified freedom of
124
information laws. A holding favoring Petitioners under either the
Privileges and Immunities Clause or the dormant Commerce Clause
could greatly expand the meaning of open records laws in the few
states that have noncitizens access restrictions. Although such laws
currently serve the primary function of ensuring government
accountability and transparency, the Court could read in a commercial
component to these statutes. Accordingly, states would be forced to
provide records on an equal basis to in-state and out-of-state citizens
and corporations or not provide records to anyone. Furthermore, two
other states enforce some form of a citizen-only access restriction like
125
126
Virginia’s: Arkansas and Tennessee. In addition to the successful
127
challenge of Delaware’s Freedom of Information Act, Tennessee’s
open access statute recently faced a challenge at the district court
128
level and is currently awaiting review by the Sixth Circuit.
122. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 2013).
123. Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
124. Shannon E. Martin & Jessica Brophy, Industries’ Proprietary Information and the
Freedom of Access to State-Held Information: A Review of the Law and its Implications for
Special Interest Businesses, 58 S.C. L. REV. 831, 832 (2007).
125. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a)(1)(A) (West 2013) (“Except as otherwise specifically
provided by this section or by laws specifically enacted to provide otherwise, all public records
shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the State of Arkansas during the
regular business hours of the custodian of the records.”).
126. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503(2)(A) (West 2013) (“All state, county and municipal
records shall, at all times during business hours . . . be open for personal inspection by any
citizen of this state and those in charge of the records shall not refuse such right of inspection to
any citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law.”); see infra note 128.
127. See Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2006) (upholding DFOIA).
128. See generally Jones v. City of Memphis, 868 F.Supp.2d 710 (W.D. Tenn. 2012). In
Jones, an out-of-state resident brought suit against various Tennessee authorities challenging
the constitutionality of the Tennessee open records statute. Id. at 715. The challenger was a
volunteer for the National Action Network and resided in Ohio. Id. He sought the release of
records regarding state contracts. Id. The State denied his petition on the ground that he was
not a citizen of Tennessee. Id. On the State’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court
held that a noncitizen’s volunteer activities in a civil rights organization did not amount to a
“common calling” protection under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 721. The
District Court also held that the Tennessee law violated neither the Privileges and Immunities
Clause nor the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 727–28. The plaintiff in Jones filed an appeal
with the Sixth Circuit, but the Sixth Circuit has stayed all proceedings until a decision in
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A. Privileges and Immunities Clause
Even armed with strong policy justifications, this case will be an
uphill battle for the Petitioners under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause given the limited group of recognized fundamental rights
under the Clause and the particularized nature of each Petitioner’s
129
requests. McBurney’s case is arguably much weaker than Hurlbert’s
because his request concerns an individual child support claim. The
Third Circuit in Lee v. Minner explicitly noted that the right at issue
must involve “matters of both national political and economic
130
importance.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that States must
accord citizens and noncitizens equal treatment only with respect to
those privileges and immunities “bearing on the vitality of the Nation
131
as a single entity.” Because McBurney’s requested information is
arguably of personal, rather than of national, importance, the Court
will likely find that his request does not implicate the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. Additionally, McBurney’s assertion that the denial
of his VFOIA request burdens his right to access courts is weak at
best. McBurney’s request does not concern access to a court
proceeding, but rather access to “documents to help decide whether
132
he should file a lawsuit.” The Court will likely follow the Fourth
Circuit’s holding that the Clause does not protect “a mechanism for
133
pre-lawsuit discovery.”
On the other hand, Hurlbert’s case has a higher chance of success.
The Court could hold that VFOIA directly interferes with Hurlbert’s

McBurney comes from the Supreme Court. Order to Stay Appellate Proceedings Pending the
Resolution of McBurney v. Young, Jones v. City of Memphis, No. 12-5558 (6th Cir. 2012).
129. Indeed, the difficulty of prevailing on the Privileges and Immunities argument became
fairly apparent at oral argument. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, McBurney v.
Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. 2012) (including repeated questions by the Justices regarding how the
purpose of VFOIA could extend beyond general government accountability, and failing to
discuss the specific facts of McBurney’s claim with respect to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause); see also Lyle Denniston, Argument recap: Agnosticism as an argument, SCOTUS BLOG
(Feb. 20, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/argument-recap-agnosticism-as-anargument/ (“Before [Respondents] took the lectern, it was quite obvious that the case was going
[their] way. Although [Petitioners’] woes could easily be exaggerated by making too much of
Justice Scalia as a determined adversary, neither of [Petitioners’] basic arguments was working
very well for [them].”).
130. Lee, 458 F.3d at 196 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
131. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 65 (1988)
132. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 467 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 2,
2012) (quoting McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 780 F.Supp.2d 439, 449 (E.D. Va. 2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
133. Id. at 467 (quoting Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65).
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134

right to pursue a common calling. Lee does not provide much
guidance on the potential success of such an argument, however,
because the Lee Court explicitly declined to address whether DFOIA
substantially burdened the challenger’s right to pursue a common
135
calling. Thus, the Third Circuit did not balance Lee’s right to pursue
his common calling with the relative burden DFOIA imposed. The
Supreme Court will be left to compare Hurlbert’s case to a limited set
of common calling cases where states explicitly banned or
significantly burdened out-of-staters’ abilities to conduct business in a
136
particular state.
A holding in favor of McBurney and Hurlbert only under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause would have a limited effect on the
dissemination of public records because the Privileges and
137
Immunities Clause applies only to individuals, not corporations. As
several amici point out, “[a] decision of this Court striking down the
Virginia statute as a violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
alone leaves states free to attempt to bar out-of-state corporations
from access to Virginia public records while affording that access to
138
Virginia corporations.” Additionally, a narrow holding under only
the Privileges and Immunities Clause could leave Virginia’s out-ofstate media exception unclear. VFOIA provides that “representatives
of newspapers and magazines with circulation in the Commonwealth,
and representatives of radio and television stations broadcasting in or
139
into the Commonwealth” shall have access to public records.
However, this provision notably leaves out Internet media
organizations, including those that have substantial readership in

134. Such a holding would be similar to the Court’s handling of other common calling cases.
See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984)
(finding that a state statute violated a noncitizen’s right to a common calling); Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (same); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 385 (1948) (same);
Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (same).
135. See Lee, 458 F.3d at 199 (“Because we conclude that the second right asserted by
Lee—the right to ‘engage in the political process with regard to matters of national political and
economic importance’—is protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, we need not
address [the common calling argument].” (citation omitted)).
136. See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (holding
that a state cannot restrict bar admission to state citizens); Toomer, 334 U.S. at 152 (holding that
a state cannot restrict commercial shrimp fishing activities to state citizens).
137. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 168, 178 (1869) (holding that a corporation did not
constitute a citizen for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
138. Brief for The Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 9, McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2013).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704 (West 2013).
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140

Virginia. As one amicus notes, “[a] straightforward reading of
VFOIA’s media exception would leave out online media as they do
not circulate in a tangible print form similar to magazines or
141
broadcast over the air similar to television news.”
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
Petitioners advance a strong and convincing argument that state
records fall under the purview of the dormant Commerce Clause.
First, the actions of collecting, trading, buying, selling, and aggregating
state records simply sound like commerce. Individuals like Hurlbert
engage in the for-profit practice of collecting and aggregating state
142
records in order to sell them. The service Hurlbert provides does
not seem too attenuated from that of a manufacturing company that
manufactures a product in-state and then distributes it to retail
locations around the globe.
Second, public records can be understood as articles of commerce.
Petitioners hope that the Court will look to its holding in Reno v.
Condon—that public records containing drivers’ information are
“article[s] of commerce”—and expand it to say that all public records
143
are articles of commerce. There is good reason for the Court to do
just that. For one, private sector companies “have relied upon public
records to obtain personal information about individuals for
144
marketing purposes.” Additionally, for decades states “have been
145
selling their public records to the highest bidder.” Numerous
companies across the country have amassed these public records—in
2004, there were more than 165 companies offering public records
146
information on the Internet, a number that may be even higher
today. If companies are in the business of gathering the types of
140. See Brief for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22, McBurney v. Young, No. 12-17 (U.S. Jan 2, 2013) (“An
out-of-state journalist desired access to various state records and filed an open records
request.”).
141. Id. at 22.
142. McBurney v. Young, 667 F.3d 454, 463 (2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 421 (U.S. Oct. 2,
2012).
143. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 28 (quoting Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148
(2000)).
144. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2002).
145. Id. at 1150. Solove notes that the state practice of selling drivers’ information was
largely restricted when Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, the subject of the
constitutional inquiry in Condon. Id. at 1150–51; see also Condon, 528 U.S. at 148–49.
146. Solove, supra note 144, at 1152–53.
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records available to Virginia’s citizens under VFOIA, then these
147
records are “articles of commerce.”
Petitioners have the best chance of success under the first tier of
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The largest hurdle
Petitioners have to overcome is convincing the Court that VFOIA
148
affects interstate commerce. If the Court accepts this, Petitioners
simply have to show that VFOIA treats in-state and out-of-state
149
interests differently, to the benefit of in-state interests. On its face,
VFOIA explicitly draws a distinction between in-state and out-of150
state citizens. If the Court has recognized that VFOIA affects
interstate commerce and that public records are “articles of
commerce,” the Court will likely hold this statute to be discriminatory
under the first tier of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. If the
Court does not accept the first-tier analysis, Petitioners will be left in
151
the land of the unpredictable Pike test. The biggest challenge
Petitioners face here is overcoming the argument that, at best,
VFOIA is not a regulation of commerce, but rather a state practice
152
that has an “incidental effect [that] may be disproportionate.” Given
the unpredictability of the effects test under Pike, the Court could do
one of two things: It could find that the small burden VFOIA places
on Hurlbert outweighs any possible financial or administrative benefit
to the State, or it could find that the burden on Hurlbert is not clearly
153
excessive in relation to the benefits to the State. Ultimately, the
Commerce question is really two questions for the Court to decide: Is

147. See Condon, 528 U.S. at 148 (holding that drivers’ records were articles of commerce
that trigger dormant Commerce Clause review).
148. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (noting that once a statute is
found to affect or burden interstate commerce, the inquiry becomes whether it discriminates on
its face).
149. United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida–Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338 (2007).
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704(A) (West 2013).
151. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (commenting that Pike balancing “is more like judging whether a particular line
is longer than a particular rock is heavy”).
152. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 129, at 11 (noting that VFOIA “is not a
regulation of Commerce” but rather it only has an incidental effect on commerce).
153. See Regan, supra note 67, at 1106 (noting that Hunt offers a “strict” balancing test
while Pike offers a “weak” balancing test). Compare Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (“[T]he burden falls on the State to justify [the
discrimination] in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interest at stake.” (emphasis
added)), with Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (finding that the statute will be upheld unless the burden it
imposes on commerce is “clearly excessive” in relation to the benefits).
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this commerce, and does VFOIA discriminate—either on its face or in
effect? Thus, McBurney presents the Court with an opportunity to
answer these questions and perhaps even clarify the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION
Petitioners in this case certainly face an uphill battle. The Court
has yet to recognize a right to “engage in the political process with
regard to matters of both national political and economic
importance” as explicitly as the Third Circuit did in Lee, let alone
recognize a relationship between accessing state records and
154
participating in the national political process. Ultimately, however,
the Privileges and Immunities argument proves most difficult because
at its core, the Clause protects only the rights “basic to the
155
maintenance or well-being of the Union.” In McBurney’s case, an
individual’s records request for personal purposes does not appear to
satisfy this high threshold. Hurlbert’s challenge is stronger because it
concerns commerce, both on the level of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause. Here, the
Court is faced with a statute that squarely discriminates between
citizens and noncitizens. If Hurlbert is able to overcome the challenge
of proving that state records constitute articles of commerce, he will
likely prevail under the first-tier dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
Regardless of its outcome, McBurney presents the Court with a
significant opportunity to clarify the relationship between the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and the dormant Commerce Clause
and to better define the contours of each respective provision.

154. See Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
155. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).

